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Abstract
This study reviews and analyses the empirical and theoretical literature on
IPO withdrawal. VOSviewer techniques are used to identify relationships
of citations, authorship, themes and patterns of the research conducted in
this area. My perspective on the current state of IPO withdrawal research is
threefold. First, I believe that the phenomenon of IPO withdrawal is not spe-
cific to a country, jurisdiction or vintage. Second, considering its economic
significance, there is a surprising scarcity of research on IPO withdrawal.
Third, existing research predominantly focuses on market level determinants
which do not fully explain IPO withdrawal. I argue that promising research
will come from non-rational and agency conflict based explanations.
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1. Introduction
In the early 1980s the global Initial Public Offering (IPO) volume kicked
off. Since, IPO volume and numbers have increased throughout the globe
with daily IPO filings. Starting in the mid 1990s we see a particular phe-
nomenon: a company files for an IPO but does not follow through, the IPO
company cancels and withdraws from the IPO. Figure 1 depicts the global
volume of IPO and indicates that IPO withdrawals are a side effect of the
IPO mechanisms. The aggregated global IPO volume since 1980 is USD
4.36 trillion, about 12% are IPO withdrawals which constitute foregone in-
vestment opportunities of around USD 0.54 trillion. Comparing Figures 1
and 2 the IPO withdrawal pattern of number and volume is similar over
time and follows the overall IPO filing pattern.
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here
One might argue that IPO withdrawal is a phenomenon specific to a
certain jurisdiction or country. In Figure 3 the global numbers and USD
volume of IPO filings against IPO withdrawals from 1980 to 2017 are con-
trasted by region. Asia shows the highest number of IPO filings, followed
by North America, Europe and Australia. The lowest IPO numbers are in
the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The global withdrawal rate
seems steady at 10-15% while a higher rate is witnessed for North and Latin
America. Europe has the highest IPO volume in USD, with a lower number
of IPO filings compared to Asia and North America but a similar withdrawal
rate. While the IPO numbers and volume may vary from region to region,
the phenomenon of IPO withdrawal is evident everywhere.
Insert Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here
Furthermore breaking down the main drivers of the IPO market, USA
and Canada dominate the North American region while China and Japan
are the major players for Asia and the UK for Europe (see Figure 4). Most
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IPO volume and quantity is attracted by few countries - though all show the
phenomenon of IPO withdrawal. An IPO withdrawal poses a puzzling event
as the company incurs the cost of filing for an IPO2 and possibly further
costs when withdrawing from the same IPO intent.
In this article, the status quo of knowledge about IPO withdrawal is sum-
marised and critically reviewed. I focus on contrasting the theoretical and
empirical evidence on the motivation of going public with the motivation
to withdraw from the IPO while highlighting the implications of IPO with-
drawal. Using VOSviewer techniques, I find that, firstly, the phenomenon of
IPO withdrawal is underrepresented in research, especially outside the major
equity markets. Secondly, research findings are not unanimous. Thirdly, I
identify non-rational and agency conflict based explanations to be a promis-
ing and insightful research area on IPO withdrawal.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews
the decision to go public and the IPO process, Section 3 introduces the
framework of IPO withdrawal contrasting theory and empirical evidence.
Section 4 sheds light on a bibliometric perspective on IPO withdrawal re-
search. Finally, the paper is concluded with a brief summary and discussion
about the implication in Section 5.
2. The motivation for an IPO
Arguably, the decision to go public, to launch an initial public offering
(IPO), is one of the most important undertakings in a company’s life cy-
cle. This phenomenon has attracted much attention in academic research.
This includes the arrays of the going public decision, IPO valuation, IPO
underpricing, IPO underperformance, and IPO withdrawal beyond others.
Understanding the motivation of companies to file for an IPO in the first
2hiring underwriters, lawyers, auditors, public relations; paying fees, dedicating vast
resources to going public, beyond others
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place holds valuable insights in understanding the motivation of companies
to revoke the very same decision and withdraw from the IPO. In order to
undertake an IPO, the company must notice its intent with the respective
authority and generally is required to prepare a filing prospectus3 (Lowry
and Schwert, 2004). The company files for an IPO when the benefits of
being publicly traded exceed the insiders’ private benefits (Loughran and
Ritter, 1995). Most explanations to uncover the decision to go public draw
from life cycle, market timing or agency cost based theories.
The life cycle framework entails that at some stage in a company’s life
cycle it becomes optimal to have a more dispersed ownership structure. The
company goes public in consequence. Early in the company’s life cycle it
is beneficial to be private. Once the company becomes sufficiently large, it
goes public (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). Bernstein (2015) posits that
companies choose to go public after innovation breakthroughs.
An IPO can be an attractive exit for insiders such as for venture cap-
italists or founders. Insiders can (partially) cash out at the IPO. Insiders
retain a certain level of ownership to be converted into cash at a future
date. Such transactions can be easily executed given the high level of liq-
uidity of publicly traded shares (Ritter and Welch, 2002). An IPO facilitates
future acquisition activity in general (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). In particu-
lar, Zingales (1995) evidences that insiders, founders or for instance venture
capitalists, sell the company at a higher value when being public.
In the presence of asymmetric information, there will be divergence from
the optimum price resulting in temporary over- and undervaluations of the
company’s equity. Companies will aim to exploit this ’window of opportu-
nity’ and consequently file for an IPO in times of favourable market over-
valuation (Lowry, 2003). Companies will stay private when unfavourable
market conditions result in an undervaluation. Henceforth, when the mar-
3it is noted that there is a considerable amount of variation in the IPO process require-
ments from country to country
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ket offer price is below a fundamental value from insiders, the company
remains private (Loughran and Ritter, 1995).
It is suggested that an IPO is undertaken to finance future endeavours,
to raise capital (Benninga et al., 2005). Likewise companies may go public
to adjust their capital structure given a favourable equity market timing en-
vironment (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Over the last decade it has become
more common for companies to operate a ’dual track’ approach (see Field
and Karpoff (2002), or more recently Aktas et al. (2017)) whereby, concur-
rent with the IPO filing, trade sale opportunities are also sought. Boeh and
Dunbar (2016) argue that firms in positive cash requirement should pursue
a private placement alongside the IPO filing. However, in most cases the
existence of a dual track approach is only observable ex-post.
Principal-agent models play an important role when separating owner-
ship and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Potential agency conflicts
arise not only between potential investors (principals) and management
(agents) in public companies with a more dispersed ownership structure,
but also between the IPO company and its underwriter(s) or risk capital
providers such as private equity or venture capital sponsors. In their study,
Brau and Fawcett (2006) ask chief financial officers about the reasons for
remaining private. Interestingly they find that most companies stay private
due to decision-making control and ownership reasons.
Bancel and Mittoo (2009) argue that, once public, the company is ex-
posed to outsider monitoring which can both be a substantial benefit or
cost. The equity market mechanism can act as a corporate control in re-
ducing agency costs. On the downside, public companies must adhere to
strict reporting, monitoring, and listing standards which can be seen as a
cost burden (Bessler et al., 2017).
Non-financial reasons such as increased publicity as well as reputation
which in consequence can enhance firm value only play a subordinated role
(Ritter and Welch, 2002).
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In summary, there are vast financial and non-financial reasons for com-
panies to go public, to undertake an initial public offering. Most likely, the
reason for going public will affect the decision to withdraw from the IPO to
establish if an IPO withdrawal is a negative or positive event. For instance,
if a company files for an IPO to finance an investment, a dual track private
placement might be more beneficial and henceforth leaves the company to
withdraw (Boeh and Dunbar, 2016).
3. The motivation for an IPO withdrawal
Despite clearly understood benefits, there are costs to the decision to
pursue an initial public offering4. Overt and hidden costs of going public,
such as increased oversight for instance, can lower the number and volume of
IPOs (Bessler et al., 2017). In consequence, it is by all means not surprising
to see a certain proportion of IPO withdrawals.
An IPO withdrawal is universally defined as an event when a company
files for an IPO but does not follow through. An IPO withdrawal can either
be done actively or passively. Having filed for an IPO the company can
actively cancel the IPO filing. Or passively not list in due time after filing
for an IPO. Despite the involvement of multiple other parties along the way
to go public, it is assumed that the ultimate decision to withdraw from the
IPO resides with the CEO (Busaba, 2006). Interestingly, there is divergence
as to the regulatory requirement of an IPO withdrawal. For instance, in
the United States of America, the company must file its IPO withdrawal
with the SEC (Form RW, SEC 2001 harbor Rule 155, Rule 457 and Rule
477). In Europe, there is no such requirement, in fact the event of an IPO
withdrawal is not even mentioned in the EU or country directives.
At an initial public offering, the company is valued for the first time.5
4hiring underwriters, lawyers, auditors, public relations; paying fees, dedicating vast
resources to going public, beyond others
5The process of an IPO involves an underwriter to conduct the price discovery process.
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Due to the limited information nature of private companies, information
asymmetries are identified during the price discovery process. Potential
investors and IPO insiders might come to diverging IPO valuations which
leaves the IPO company to withdraw its IPO (Loughran and Ritter, 1995).
The valuation of an IPO company is influenced by a variety of firm
and non-firm specific characteristics (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). Status
signalling as well as a combination of resource and information transfer is
identified by Owen-Smith et al. (2015) to influence this valuation. The IPO
company and underwriter must consider the optimal level of information
revelation in conjunction with the desired accuracy of price discovery (Sher-
man and Titman, 2002). The equilibrium offer price can be noisy. Intro-
ducing signalling theory, potential investors value the IPO company based
on a subjective probability of expectation of future success. Owen-Smith
et al. (2015) suggest that this valuation is influenced by a network of strong
and weak positive and negative signals represented by firm and non-firm
characteristics.
If no signal is sent to the market, asymmetric information will result in
adverse selection in the IPO market (Leland and Pyle, 1977). While effec-
tive signalling depends on a ’sufficient’ number of signals (Spence, 1973).
Signalling can incur potential welfare costs, henceforth a key efficiency as-
sumption is that signals must be too costly to be imitated in order to be
reliable and credible (Leland and Pyle, 1977).
Benveniste et al. (2002) argue that signalling generally decreases the
ex ante uncertainty about the IPO company. With this principle, strong
positive signals such as certification increase, negative ones decrease the
aggregate demand for the IPO shares (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). IPO com-
panies that intrinsically face higher uncertainty have higher evaluation costs
The interested reader can consult Benveniste and Spindt (1989), Busaba et al. (2001),
Jenkinson and Jones (2004), Sherman and Titman (2002) and Busaba and Chang (2010)
for a discussion on bookbuilding in the IPO process.
7
as valuation is more difficult (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). At any time
of the IPO process, the IPO company can change course and withdraw the
IPO. The issuer reserves an option of IPO withdrawal before its completion.
A company becomes more likely for IPO withdrawal in particular when the
ex ante uncertainty around its value is high followed by a higher propensity
for negative information perception (Busaba et al., 2001).
As information can be revealed directly through the IPO prospectus or
indirectly through the price (Rock, 1986), the IPO company can (falsely)
influence the unobservable quality to the potential investors (Connelly et al.,
2010). However, research on the IPO bookbuilding process and its role in
the information revelation calls into question the actual information produc-
tion (Jenkinson and Jones, 2004, Lowry and Schwert, 2004). The benefits
and costs of information revelation are traded-off by the IPO company and
underwriter (Sherman and Titman, 2002). If the information acquisition
costs are too high for the potential investors, the company is assumed to
remain private (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989).
It is suggested that the IPO company must likewise trade-off the costs
of underpricing against the probability of IPO withdrawal since Edelen and
Kadlec (2005) argue that underpricing decreases the probability of IPO with-
drawal. As a consequence, IPO withdrawals occur when the certain issuer’s
fundamental value threshold is not met with the equilibrium price (Chem-
manur and Fulghieri, 1999).
In agency theory, IPO companies face principal-agent conflicts between
management and the potential investors. While management represents the
controlling party of the firm’s resources and the shareholders own the firm’s
resources (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Within this framework, to under-
stand the decision of IPO withdrawal managerial, firm, and environmental
risk factors need to be examined (Latham and Braun, 2010). This is en-
forced by Boulton and Campbell (2016) who find evidence that managerial
overconfidence is associated with higher underpricing.
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3.1. Overview on the IPO withdrawal research
An emerging literature examines the theoretical implications, determi-
nants, and the afterlife of IPO withdrawal starting with Welch (1992) who
argues that issuers withdraw from the IPO when market valuations falls
below a certain level. Benveniste and Busaba (1997) and Dunbar (1998)
document the presence of IPO withdrawal in North America and identify
a puzzle as only a small fraction returns to the IPO market. The working
paper of Lewis et al. (2001) contrasts market timing considerations with
IPO withdrawal. Benveniste et al. (2003) assume that the issuer goes pub-
lic to generate funds for a project. Through the conditional information in
the bookbuilding process, the issuer learns about the positive or negative
nature of the project. Henceforth, considering information spillovers, they
argue that the issuer can either fund the project privately or cancel the very
same project. Companies withdraw from IPO based on unfavourable mar-
ket conditions. In a survey conducted by Brau and Fawcett (2006), most
chief financial officers justify the IPO withdrawal with unfavourable market
conditions.
Focusing on the bookbuilding and underwriting process Busaba et al.
(2001) and Busaba (2006) identify the event of IPO withdrawal as a real
option, testing the determinants of IPO withdrawal. The role of the under-
writer and its in influence on pricing to overt IPO withdrawal is examined in
Busaba et al. (2018). This is extended by Dunbar and Foerster (2008) who
broaden the set of possible market and firm level explanatory variables. Lian
and Wang (2009) examine the negative effect of IPO withdrawal into sub-
sequent IPO pricing focusing on acquisition valuations of withdrawn IPOs
on a consequent paper (Lian and Wang, 2012). While Chen et al. (2010)
contemplate IPO withdrawal from a Bayesian point of view. They focus on
the motivation for withdrawn IPO companies to consequently retry in Chen
et al. (2017).
Latham and Braun (2010) contrast the CEO ownership with the decision
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to go public and to withdraw from the IPO, finding a U-shaped relationship.
Boeh and Southam (2011) evidence a negative effect of financial intermedia-
tion with IPO withdrawal such as venture capitalist involvement or prestige
of underwriter. Under the agency conflict framework they explore the re-
lationship between the CEO and the prestige of underwriters - which in
consequence is hypothesised to affect IPO withdrawal.
The post IPO withdrawal outcomes are examined in Boeh and Dunbar
(2013) while the authors emphasise the capital issuance in Boeh and Dunbar
(2016)6. Focusing on the wave-like nature of IPO markets, Boeh and Dun-
bar (2014) argue that past decisions convey private information about the
collective issuers’ view on the IPO market. Dunbar (2011) attests a positive
effect of IPOs in registration on IPO withdrawals based on US IPO filings
from 1998 to 2007. Hao (2011) takes a different perspective and examines
the positive relationship between IPO withdrawal and litigation risk.
Mantecon and Thistle (2011) challenge the public equity market as a
screening device for IPOs, while Bergbrant et al. (2015) scrutinise the debt
capital market perspective and IPO withdrawal suggesting that credit con-
ditions are directly affecting the IPO market. A more theoretical approach
is undertaken by Owen-Smith et al. (2015) who lobby for network effects
in explaining IPO withdrawal. Bernstein (2015) analyses the effect of going
public on innovation and finds no evidence for underwriter certification but
market condition effects on the probability of IPO withdrawal.
In a European context IPO withdrawal is first mentioned in Lucey et al.
(2018) and extended to the first pan-European study by Helbing and Lucey
(2018). Most recently, Fan and Yamada (2017) and Fan and Yamada (2018)
examine the relationship between ownership structure and IPO withdrawal
in Japan (working papers).
6SSRN working papers
10
3.2. IPO withdrawal frameworks
Most theoretical frameworks on initial public offerings are implicitly or
explicitly assuming that the market valuation of the IPO company is al-
ways higher than the fundamental value from issuers. The IPO company
is accepting any IPO price from the price discovery process (Welch, 1992,
Benveniste and Busaba, 1997). The position is unanimous that a company
withdraws from the IPO when the information revealed is sufficiently nega-
tive, while negative information is more probable for IPO companies with a
higher ex ante uncertainty (Benveniste and Spindt, 1989).
Indeed, the IPO company can cancel the IPO filing at any time up until
the selling has started (Busaba, 2006). There are only a handful of pa-
pers exclusively discussing, in different contexts, the phenomenon of IPO
withdrawal (see Busaba et al. (2001), Busaba (2006), Dunbar and Foer-
ster (2008), Owen-Smith et al. (2015), Helbing and Lucey (2018), Fan and
Yamada (2018)).
Building on a strong bookbuilding framework, Busaba et al. (2001) ev-
idence that IPO withdrawal is not specific to a particular period of time,
industry or firm size. The authors examine 2,150 IPO companies from 1984-
1994 in the USA. They set up a binary framework of the firm specific reser-
vation value and the market investor valuation which both are influenced
by firm and market specific variables. In case an IPO company disagrees
with the market valuation, it can cancel the IPO at any time during the
marketing process. The authors examine how the IPO company’s choice to
withdraw from the IPO affects the IPO outcome and hypothesise that IPO
withdrawal induces an option into the IPO process. They find that this op-
tion of IPO withdrawal has a negatives correlation with IPO underpricing
and henceforth claim that underpricing is an incentive payment for infor-
mation revelation (Busaba et al., 2001). The empirical evidence suggests
that venture capital involvement or better market conditions decrease the
probability of IPO withdrawal. The availability of other forms of funding
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(debt), or the offer size increase same. Within the bookbuilding framework,
the option to withdraw induces a strengthened bargaining position of the
IPO company.
The IPO company exercises control over the degree of underpricing. This
idea is followed up on and extended in Busaba (2006). The exercise price
of the real option equals to the issuer’s reservation value. Using the same
dataset of 2,150 IPO companies from 1984-1994 in the USA, Busaba (2006)
argues that the IPO company can benefit from bookbuilding at the full ex-
pected value with the inherent option value. In particular the IPO company
benefits from bookbuilding when the ex ante uncertainty about the issuer’s
market value is high.
Dunbar and Foerster (2008) examine the issuers withdrawing an IPO
that return later for a successful offering. The dataset includes 7,442 IPO
companies in the USA and spans from 1985-2000. The authors hypothesise
that the probability of IPO withdrawal is positively related to the proba-
bility of a successful return which in turn has an impact on the pricing of
the IPO. Taking into account firm and non-firm specific characteristics, the
authors argue that IPO companies expected to withdraw, with a low chance
to return, lower the offer price to follow through. They find that financial in-
termediaries, such as prestigious underwriters and venture capital investors,
as well as better market conditions increase the likelihood of a successful
return for a withdrawn IPO company.
Dunbar and Foerster (2008) evidence that such IPO companies in con-
sequence face higher underpricing. This framework is opposed to Busaba
et al. (2001) who posit that IPO companies exert control over underpricing
with the option to withdraw and hence see less pronounced underpricing.
Dunbar and Foerster (2008) furthermore argue that second time IPO com-
panies would be perceived riskier by investors due to the inherent ’lemon’
problem (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, they find that financial intermediators
such as reputable underwriter and venture capitalist serve as a strong and
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positive certification for the IPO company’s future success. Non-rational
and agency conflict based aspects, such as suggested by Brau and Fawcett
(2006), are not considered.
A different framework is provided by Owen-Smith et al. (2015) in an
interdisciplinary journal focusing on the network effects of organisational
decision-making. The authors examine network effects of high-technology
IPOs in the USA from 1997-2000. They place the IPO withdrawal within
a network, shaped by social and economic co-occurring mechanisms. They
claim that all networks show some mix of information transfer, status sig-
nalling, and social influence processes. The authors extend the firm and
non-firm explanations and, for the first time, challenge non-rational as well
as status signalling explanations for IPO withdrawal. It is argued that
IPO companies and managers have disincentives to withdraw from the IPO.
However, the authors fail to uncover further theoretical and empirical ideas
about non-rational decision making influencing IPO withdrawal. Owen-
Smith et al. (2015) moreover find evidence for the positive certification of
underwriter and VC partners consonant with Dunbar and Foerster (2008)
and Boeh and Southam (2011).
The first European research on IPO withdrawal is conducted by Hel-
bing and Lucey (2018) with a unique dataset of 2,808 IPO companies in
the largest European countries from 2001-2015. The authors show that the
empirical validity of previous knowledge cannot be applied in the European
context, based on the different regulatory environment in Europe (for dif-
ferences in the regulatory and listing standard consult Ritter (2003), Johan
(2010) and Takahasi and Yamada (2015)). To the contrary, they show that
the strong certification effects of financial intermediators are non-existent in
the European IPO context. While the effect for private equity and venture
capital sponsors even has a positive influence on the probability of with-
drawal.7 Helbing and Lucey (2018) introduce agency based explanations for
7The different role, reputation, and performance of venture capital and private equity
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IPO withdrawal. They argue that the lack of appropriate control mecha-
nisms increases the probability of IPO withdrawal. The presence of CEO
duality decreases same as non-rational behaviour of, for instance, the CEO
is pushing through a potentially value-decreasing IPO. Boulton and Camp-
bell (2016) find evidence that managerial overconfidence is associated with
higher underpricing. However, no further explanation or detailed analysis is
provided.
In a nutshell, there are very few papers contributing a conceptual frame-
work on IPO withdrawals while the majority of research on IPO withdrawal
is of empirical nature. This is, in a quintessence, what is known about IPO
withdrawal:
A company withdraws from the IPO when sufficiently negative (condi-
tional) information is revealed during the price discovery process. The neg-
ative information pushes the market valuation below a certain threshold of
fundamental reservation value at which point the IPO company withdraws.
When the ex ante uncertainty of the IPO company is high, the probability
for negative information revelation is assumed to be higher. The ex ante
uncertainty of an IPO company’s future success is conditioned on various
firm, offer, and market conditions which however do not show the same effect
over time, location or industry. While the occurrence of IPO withdrawal is
independent of time, location or industry. In the end, the final decision on
IPO withdrawal resides with the CEO.
3.3. The afterlife of an IPO withdrawal
Another area about IPO withdrawal that has received limited attention
concerns the afterlife of an IPO withdrawal. Much of this research has been
in the areas of entrepreneurial finance, examples being Brau et al. (2010)
and Field and Karpoff (2002).
sponsors is discussed in Tykvova and Walz (2007), Groh et al. (2010) and Chemmanur
and He (2011) beyond others.
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More recent work by Dunbar (2011) and Boeh and Dunbar (2013) begins
to evaluate the afterlife of withdrawn firms, surfacing the determinants of
different post-withdrawal outcomes. In Figure 5 the event of an IPO with-
drawal is further deciphered by Boeh and Dunbar (2013). They argue that
companies withdraw from IPO either because they are ’bad’ IPO candidates
and get rejected by the market or they are ’good’ IPO companies. In the
latter case, the IPO companies withdraw from the IPO intentionally. Ei-
ther as they get acquired or as the IPO market valuation is lower than its
fundamental reservation value. They also find that an IPO withdrawal has
a positive reaction effect on the industry. In a further analysis, Boeh and
Dunbar (2016) focus on the dual of track of a private placement for IPO
companies. They assume that most IPOs are motivated by capital require-
ments and henceforth argue that IPO companies should pursue a dual track.
Companies consequently withdraw from the IPO once the private placement
becomes more beneficial.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Lian and Wang (2009) and Lian and Wang (2012) apply the Akerlof
’lemon’ problem to withdrawn IPO companies returning to the IPO market.
They argue that withdrawn IPO companies face a valuation penalty as they
are perceived riskier. However, companies can withdraw from the IPO in
favour of a superior financial alternative. Lian and Wang (2009) define
merger and acquisition activities as such a superior alternative to an IPO,
while a benefit exists only when the IPO company is acquired before formally
withdrawing.
Busaba (2006) analyses the role of bookbuilding within the process of
IPO withdrawal and hypothesises that underwriters who are involved in
a higher number of IPO withdrawals are expected to loose future business.
Dunbar (1998) and Dunbar and Foerster (2008) find empirical evidence that
withdrawn IPO companies switch to a more prestigious underwriter when
attempting a second IPO.
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When analysing the relationship between going public and its effect on
innovation, Bernstein (2015) finds that withdrawn IPO companies show a
lower rate of external patents acquisitions. But evidence a higher rate of
internal patent generation compared to IPO companies that consequently
listed. Bernstein (2015) argues that IPO companies that go public can
attract human capital better than withdrawn IPO companies.
In general, the afterlife of withdrawn IPO companies, its macroeconomic
as well as micro level effects need more research attention to decipher the
puzzle of an IPO withdrawal.
4. A bibliometric perspective on IPO withdrawal research
I use VOSviewer techniques8 to examine the literature on IPO with-
drawal from a bibliometric perspective. Fundamental bibliometric approaches
involve surfacing the relatedness between articles, authors, and main re-
search themes. This relatedness can be presented nicely in graphical ways
of network models. My sample includes 34 articles that either mention IPO
withdrawal or are focused on this phenomenon. A breakdown of the main
journals, with eight articles on SSRN, where the articles are published is
given in Figure 6.
Insert Figure 6 about here
The most frequent keywords on IPO withdrawal research are depicted in
Figure 7. ’Public offering’ is in the center, closely linked to ’book building’
and ’initial returns’. The outcome is separate but shows high relatedness
with acquisition. The papers by Busaba et al. (2001), Busaba (2006), Dun-
bar and Foerster (2008) and Lian and Wang (2009), Lian and Wang (2012)
represent this pattern.
Insert Figure 7 about here
8Leiden University: http://www.vosviewer.com/
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A creation of network maps based on the title and abstract fields is
given in Figure 8. An overview is provided on the IPO withdrawal literature
contrasting the most frequent themes of the different papers. This network
map shows what the IPO withdrawal network is talking about. The main
research themes analyse the issuer, the underwriter/ investment bank and
the effect on valuation or underpricing.
Insert Figure 8 about here
Contrasting the most frequent themes on IPO withdrawal research over
time in Figure 9 it becomes visible that starting in the early 2000s the
network was dominated by research themes such as ’underwriter’ and ’un-
derpricing’, moving in time forward to ’evidence’, ’determinants’ and ’effect’
with a focus on market level information. Lately, research agenda is shift-
ing to a more agency based focused examining ’relationship’, ’CEO’, and
’influence’. This network map nicely visualises where the IPO withdrawal
research is orginiated and where it is going. As reviewed above, IPO with-
drawal was first explained using market level data in connection with fi-
nancial intermediators. The relationship between IPO withdrawal and IPO
pricing, including underpricing and valuation, was tried to be uncovered.
The research on IPO withdrawal is gradually moving to a more firm level
focus including corporate governance and non-rational observations.
Insert Figure 9 about here
Research on IPO withdrawal is driven by three main researchers: Bus-
aba, Dunbar, and Boeh. This becomes visible in Figure 10 which depicts
the citation patterns showing the relatedness based on the number of times
cited. This shows who is cited most and who is leading the research agenda.
Interestingly, five out of the eight papers on the SSRN are by those three
researchers. The authors all focus on the US American market and each
have a specific research theme. While Busaba (2006) scrutinises the book-
building process, Dunbar and Foerster (2008) analyses the underwriter and
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macroeconomic effect of an IPO, Boeh and Southam (2011) in particular
examines the financial intermediators such as venture capitalists.
Insert Figure 10 about here
The bibliometric perspective on IPO withdrawal research enforces the
conclusions from the review on the existing state-of-the-art literature. IPO
withdrawal was first explained using market level data in connection with
financial intermediators. It is gradually moving to a more firm level focus
including corporate governance and non-rational observations. It still lacks
attention on the firm sentiment and afterlife of an IPO withdrawal. Also,
current research does not offer ideas on what can be learnt from withdrawn
IPOs to practice, future IPO filings, and for instance IPO delistings.
5. Conclusion
In this article, the status quo of knowledge about IPO withdrawal is
summarised and reviewed. I focus on contrasting the theoretical and empir-
ical evidence on the decision of going public with the decision to withdraw
from the IPO. What can we learn from such a puzzling decision as an IPO
withdrawal? My findings of this review are threefold. First, I believe that
the phenomenon of IPO withdrawal is not specific to a country, jurisdiction
or vintage. Second, I argue that there is a surprising scarcity of research
on IPO withdrawal given its economic significance. The existing theoret-
ical and empirical research on IPO withdrawal is not unanimous - in the
end an IPO withdrawal is a social phenomenon. Most research focuses on
the relationship between IPO withdrawal and IPO pricing. Furthermore,
the theoretical frameworks on IPO withdrawal derived from US centered
data cannot be applied ubiquitously. Recent extension to the European and
Asian markets have questioned the prevailing frameworks (see Helbing and
Lucey (2018), Fan and Yamada (2017) and Fan and Yamada (2018)).
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Third, I challenge the presumption that market level determinants are
the main driver of IPO withdrawal. I believe great insights come from non-
rational and agency conflict based explanations uncovering the firm level
sentiment leading up to the IPO withdrawal and the afterlife. An area that
is, to my best knowledge, not yet explored, mainly given the proprietary
data environment, is the relationship between the IPO allocation mecha-
nisms9 and IPO withdrawal. Same applies to the relationship between IPO
withdrawal and IPO delistings. A more behavioural and non-rational ap-
proach on decision making would yield great insights about IPO withdrawal,
the determinants and effects on a macro and micro level. This is backed by
the bibliometric perspective using VOSviewer techniques.
9Jenkinson et al. (2017) examine the IPO allocation mechanisms with proprietary data.
19
References
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The Market for ” Lemons ”: Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3),
488–500.
Aktas, N., C. Andres, and A. Ozdakak (2017). The interplay of IPO and
M&A markets: The many ways one affects the other. In Forthcoming in
Oxford Handbook of IPOs edited by Douglas Cumming and Sofia Johan,
pp. 1–32.
Allen, F. and G. R. Faulhaber (1989). Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO
Market. Journal of Financial Economics 23, 303–323.
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2002). Market Timing and Capital Structure.
The Journal of Finance 57 (1).
Bancel, F. and U. R. Mittoo (2009). Why Do European Firms Go Public?
European Financial Management 15 (4), 844–884.
Benninga, S., M. Helmantel, and O. Sarig (2005). The timing of initial
public offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 75, 115–132.
Benveniste, L. M. and W. Y. Busaba (1997). Bookbuilding vs. Fixed Price:
An Analysis of Competing Strategies for Marketing IPOs. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 383–403.
Benveniste, L. M., W. Y. Busaba, and W. J. Wilhelm (2002). Information
Externalities and the Role of Underwriters in Primary Equity Markets.
Journal of Financial Intermediation 11 (1), 61–86.
Benveniste, L. M., A. Ljungqvist, W. J. Wilhelm, and X. Yu (2003). Evi-
dence of Information Spillovers in the Production of Investment Banking
Services. The Journal of Finance 58 (2), 577–608.
20
Benveniste, L. M. and P. A. Spindt (1989). How investment bankers deter-
mine the offer price and allocation of new issues. Journal of Financial
Economics 24 (2), 343–361.
Bergbrant, M. C., D. Bradley, and D. M. Hunter (2015). Does bank loan
supply affect the supply of equity capital? Evidence from new share is-
suance and withdrawal. Journal of Financial Intermediation 29, 32–45.
Bernstein, S. (2015). Does Going Public Affect Innovation? Journal of
Finance 70 (4), 1365–1403.
Bessler, W., C. Schneck, and J. Zimmermann (2017). Growth Strategies of
Initial Public Offerings in Europe.
Boeh, K. and C. Dunbar (2014). IPO waves and the issuance process. Jour-
nal of Corporate Finance 25, 455–473.
Boeh, K. K. and C. G. Dunbar (2013). Post IPO Withdrawal Outcomes.
Boeh, K. K. and C. G. Dunbar (2016). Raising Capital after IPO With-
drawal.
Boeh, K. K. and C. Southam (2011). Impact of initial public offering coali-
tion on deal completion. Venture Capital 13 (4), 313–336.
Boulton, T. J. and T. C. Campbell (2016). Managerial confidence and initial
public offerings. Journal of Corporate Finance 37, 375–392.
Brau, J. C. and S. Fawcett (2006). Initial public offerings: An analysis of
theory and practice. Journal of Finance 61 (1), 399–436.
Brau, J. C., N. K. Sutton, and N. W. Hatch (2010). Dual-track versus single-
track sell-outs: An empirical analysis of competing harvest strategies.
Journal of Business Venturing 25 (4), 389–402.
Busaba, W. Y. (2006). Bookbuilding, the option to withdraw, and the timing
of IPOs. Journal of Corporate Finance 12 (2), 159–186.
21
Busaba, W. Y., L. M. Benveniste, and R.-J. Guo (2001). The option to with-
draw IPOs during the premarket: empirical analysis. Journal of Financial
Economics 60, 73–102.
Busaba, W. Y. and C. Chang (2010). Bookbuilding vs. fixed price revisited:
The effect of aftermarket trading. Journal of Corporate Finance 16, 370–
381.
Busaba, W. Y., Z. Liu, and F. Restrepo (2018). Do Underwriters Price-Up
IPOs to Prevent Withdrawal?
Chemmanur, T. J. and P. Fulghieri (1999). A Theory of the Going-Public
Decision. The Review of Financial Studies 12 (2), 249–279.
Chemmanur, T. J. and J. He (2011). IPO waves, product market compe-
tition, and the going public decision: Theory and evidence. Journal of
Financial Economics 101 (2), 382–412.
Chen, G., N. Sutton, and J. Qi (2017). From setback to comeback: Mo-
tivations for withdrawn IPO firms to return. The Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance 66 (c), 259–264.
Chen, H. C., R. C. W. Fok, and S. H. Kang (2010). Issuers’ incentives
and tests of Baron’s model of IPO underpricing. Review of Quantitative
Finance and Accounting 35 (1), 71–87.
Connelly, B. L., S. T. Certo, D. Ireland, and C. R. Reutzel (2010). Signaling
theory: A review and assessment. Journal of Management 37 (1), 39–67.
Dunbar, C. G. (1998). The Choice between Firm-Commitment and Best-
Efforts Offering Methods in IPOs: The Effect of Unsuccessful Offers. Jour-
nal of Financial Intermediation 90, 60–90.
Dunbar, C. G. (2011). IPOs in Registration.
22
Dunbar, C. G. and S. R. Foerster (2008). Second time lucky? Withdrawn
IPOs that return to the market. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (3),
610–635.
Edelen, R. M. and G. B. Kadlec (2005). Issuer surplus and the partial
adjustment of IPO prices to public information. Journal of Financial
Economics 77, 347–373.
Fan, P. and K. Yamada (2017). Who Decide IPO Withdrawal and When?
Fan, P. and K. Yamada (2018). Same Bed Different Dream in IPO: The
Analysis of IPO Withdraw Decision and Composition of IPO Shares.
Field, L. C. and J. M. Karpoff (2002). Takeover defenses of IPO firms.
Journal of Finance 57 (5), 1857–1889.
Groh, A. P., H. von Liechtenstein, and K. Lieser (2010). The European Ven-
ture Capital and Private Equity country attractiveness indices. Journal
of Corporate Finance 16, 205–224.
Hao, Q. G. (2011). Securities litigation, withdrawal risk and initial public
offerings. Journal of Corporate Finance 17, 438–456.
Helbing, P. and B. Lucey (2018). The Determinants of IPO Withdrawal -
Evidence from Europe.
Jenkinson, T. and H. Jones (2004). Bids and Allocations in European IPO
Bookbuilding. Journal of Finance 54 (5), 2309–2338.
Jenkinson, T., H. Jones, and F. Suntheim (2017). Quid Pro Quo? What
Factors Influence IPO Allocations to Investors? Journal of Finance Forth-
comin.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976). Theory of the firm: Manage-
rial behavor, agency costs an ownership structure. Journal of Financial
Economics 3, 305–360.
23
Johan, S. A. (2010). Listing standards as a signal of IPO preparedness and
quality. International Review of Law and Economics 30, 128–144.
Latham, S. and M. R. Braun (2010). To IPO or Not To IPO: Risks, Uncer-
tainty and the Decision to Go Public. British Journal of Management 21,
666–683.
Leland, H. E. and D. H. Pyle (1977). Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance 32 (2),
371.
Lewis, C. M., J. K. Seward, and L. Foster-Johnson (2001). Busted IPOs
and Windows of Misopportunity.
Lian, Q. and Q. Wang (2009). Does the Market Incorporate Previous
IPO Withdrawals When Pricing Second-Time IPOs? Financial Man-
agement 38 (2), 357–380.
Lian, Q. and Q. Wang (2012). Acquisition valuations of withdrawn IPOs:
When IPO plans turn into mergers. Journal of Banking & Finance 36,
1424–1436.
Loughran, T. and J. R. Ritter (1995). The New Issues Puzzle. The Journal
of Finance 50 (1).
Lowry, M. (2003). Why does IPO volume fluctuate so much? Journal of
Financial Economics 67, 3–40.
Lowry, M. and G. W. Schwert (2004). Is the IPO pricing process efficient?
Journal of Financial Economics 71, 3–26.
Lucey, B. M., S. A. Vigne, L. Ballester, L. Barbopoulos, J. Brzeszczynski,
O. Carchano, N. Dimic, V. Fernandez, F. Gogolin, A. González-Urteaga,
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Figure 1: Global IPO Volume in numbers
27
Figure 2: Global IPO Volume in USD mn
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Figure 3: Global IPO Volume and Number by Region
Note: The chart shows the absolute numbers (left) and volume (right) of IPO filings vs. IPO withdrawals by region between 1980 and 2017. The withdrawal rate is
given in grey.
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Figure 4: Global IPO Volume by Major Countries
Figure 5: Why Firms Withdraw from IPO’s, Boeh and Dunbar (2013)
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